You could go to my home page, or the main WWII controversy page.
If you mail me, I would appreciate permission to quote you on this site, particularly if you disagree with me.
There are many things about World War II that have been debated, and I have firm opinions on some of these. This is my attempt to answer certain questions, of greater and lesser importance.
This being specifically about Pearl Harbor, the first thing I'd like to do is point to the Pearl Harbor Working Group site, where they've got a lot of interesting stuff, including a lot of original material.
Was there advance warning of the Pearl Harbor attack that was suppressed?
No. With a few exceptions, information gathered in Washington was passed on to the field. These exceptions are attributable to bad decisions and general delays; while short comments and orders could be sent almost as fast then as now, it was much more difficult to send large amounts of information. The situation was very confusing, and just because it is possible today to gather facts from here and there that pointed at the Pearl Harbor strike does not mean that there was any way to predict it. Facts could probably be gleaned to support any other reasonable course of action almost as well. It was well known that war between Japan and the United States was imminent, and messages were sent to Pearl Harbor, as well as other bases in the Pacific, emphasizing this. Nobody knew exactly what the Japanese would do in starting such a war.
The Pearl Harbor strike was a natural thing, was it not?
No. The higher Navy officials in Japan were against it. The Fleet commander, Yamamoto, threatened to resign unless given permission to launch that strike, and the Navy staff reluctantly permitted it. Yamamoto thought it would cost Japan some carriers, and further must have known that it would be sheer luck to catch American carriers, since these were seldom in port for long. There was no reason to believe that a war would open with such a strike.
Does this exonerate Kimmel and Short?
No way. While there was no way to predict ahead of time exactly what the Japanese were going to do, Kimmel and Short should have taken precautions against what they might do. When Chennault had been at Pearl Harbor, he had anticipated a Sunday dawn strike, and so the possibility should have been considered. Kimmel knew perfectly well that he did not know where the Japanese carriers were, and that they could approach the Hawaiian islands. (He asked his analysts if the carriers could be rounding Diamond Head just then; their answer was that they would hope the carriers would be spotted first.)
Did somebody detect the Pearl Harbor Striking Force before the attack?
No. Toland claimed to have talked to a man who had detected the Striking Force north of Hawaii with a radio direction finder. This is impossible for two reasons. First, the Striking Force did not transmit any radio signals, being perfectly aware of such devices as direction finders. Second, such direction finders provided no range information, but merely provided an approximate bearing. It is certainly possible that some operator on the West Coast found Japanese language transmissions on a bearing passing north of Hawaii, but that is not the same thing. (A radar station did detect the incoming Japanese attack, and reported it, but a shipment of B-17s was due, and the officer in charge believed that is what the radar found.)
No. The Japanese embassy was in fact instructed to deliver a certain document to the U.S. State Department half an hour before the Pearl Harbor attack. The embassy staff kept this as hush-hush as possible, and none of the high-ranking staff had good typing skills. Consequently, the document was not delivered until after the bombs had started to fall. Some Japanese apologists have argued that Japan almost declared war on the U.S. before the beginning of hostilities, and would have if some embassy staff had done their jobs. This is false for three reasons.
First, the document in question was not a declaration of war. There is an on-line copy of the Fourteen-Part Message at the Pearl Harbor site, where you may read it for yourself. It is an interesting collection of lies, distortions, and duplicity, if you fancy such things. It lists various fancied grievances, and assumes that the best road to peace is for the Japanese to finish their conquest of China. One thing it does not do is suggest any state of war between the United States and Japan; the closest it does is despair of the future of negotiations. According to the Pearl Harbor Working group, the actual declaration of war was drawn up almost as an afterthought.
Second, why was it delivered late? The embassy received the document rather late in the day of December 6, without instructions as to what to do with it. The last part of the message, with the instructions, arrived early on December 7. Had the Japanese government been interested in ensuring the timely delivery, they could have done several things. They could have sent it earlier, or sent it with instructions that a clean presentation copy be prepared immediately, or specified that the delivery must be made on time. Presumably, the Japanese did not select fools for their U.S. embassy, and the officials in Washington thought that it was more important to present a clean copy late rather than a messy one on time, and there was apparently no indication, to them, that this was a bad idea.
Third, consider the purpose of a declaration of war. Clearly, the benefit is that it tells nations when they are at peace. When countries are at peace, even a watchful and hostile peace, their forces can generally refrain from shooting at each other, and therefore they can avoid needless casualties and prevent incidents that might lead to all-out war. Had the Japanese delivered a declaration of war to the State Department half an hour before the attack, this would not serve that purpose, and would therefore have been of technical significance anyway.
The conclusion is that the Japanese could not be troubled to ensure the prompt delivery of a document that fell short of being a legal technicality.
It seems very unlikely. First, President Roosevelt was pushing the United States hard into a war with Germany. Roosevelt and Marshall were uneasy about the Pacific, partly since they feared that the United States might be drawn into a war with Japan and kept farther away from war with Germany. Churchill did write in his diary that he was happy that Japan attacked the U.S., since it would bring the U.S. into the war. Churchill was a great Prime Minister for his leadership, his grand vision, his oratory, and his determination. He frequently did not have a firm grasp on how things would turn out. One of the greatest Commonwealth defeats, at Tobruk, was a direct result of his interference. He felt that he could partially control Soviet actions by personal diplomacy with Stalin. In short, I don't consider Churchill's reactions as evidence that Pearl Harbor could reasonably be expected to bring the U.S. into the war against Germany.
Second, why would a successful Japanese attack be more useful to Roosevelt than an unsuccessful one? If the Japanese attacked by surprise, that was going to bring the United States into war against Japan. What would be the difference, in that respect, between the Japanese facing little or lots of resistance?
Third, if Roosevelt had wanted the Pearl Harbor attack to be a surprise, why had he allowed numerous warnings of imminent war and possible air attack to be sent to Pearl Harbor? These are present in great number in the Congressional report.
Fourth, the United States came involved in war with Germany on Germany's initiative, when Hitler declared war. Hitler was widely considered a brilliant, erratic, and dangerous diplomat. Could Roosevelt have counted on him to do exactly as Roosevelt wanted?
All contents of these pages Copyright 1997 by David H. Thornley.