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Clausewitz began On War by suggesting that war should consist in a swift contest in which both sides would use all their resources, and then by showing that it would be impossible to use all ones resources at once. In war, each side will have various sorts of advantages, and one of the tricks is to use them. I have examples of the ingenious use of advantages.
Leonhard's The Art of Maneuver cites a maneuver of Scipio Africanus in Spain. Scipio's army was awakened early in the morning, ate breakfast, and marched out in order of battle. The Carthaginians were obliged to march out to face his army, without breakfast. Scipio then delayed the battle for several hours, so that the Carthaginians were weak with hunger.
Scipio had to have some pre-existing advantages to pull this off. The Carthaginians had to form up with their entire army. They had no way to hold the Romans off, should they attempt to eat breakfast in shifts. Further, they were not in a good position to precipitate battle themselves, before hunger became a serious problem. Scipio therefore had a supremely effective, if clumsy, way of forcing the Carthaginian army to do certain things, and found a way of forcing them to do things to his advantage.
In the recent Gulf War, the U.S. forces had an advantage in that they could navigate anywhere and know where they were, due to their GPS receivers. They used this to maneuver deeper in the desert than the Iraqis dared, since the Iraqi army would have become lost, and used that to outflank the enemy.
I have read a description of a tank battle in France in 1944. Normally, the U.S. Sherman tank was at a considerable disadvantage against the German Panther tank. In this battle, the U.S. Army began by having their artillery fire smoke on the proposed battleground, thus dramatically lowering visibility. The result was that, when an American and a German tank encountered one another, it was likely to be at any sort of orientation, not just the front-to-front that the Panthers excelled at. The Sherman was capable of destroying the Panther from any angle but the front at close range, which was a good counter to the Panther's ability to destroy a Sherman at any angle at any reasonable range. Further, the Sherman had an excellent and easy to use turret traverse, whereas the Panther's was very slow. The result was that, unless the Panther gun was pointed at a suddenly-appearing Sherman, the Sherman would fire first, and kill the Panther unless approaching from the front. By this means, the Panther's advantages of greatly superior gun and armor were nullified by the U.S. advantage of turret traverse.
Julius Caesar entered Gaul with good troops, but not superior to the Gallic warrior class, and far less numerous. He played politics to try to avoid a general rising, and subdued areas of Gaul by using his logistical and fortification advantages. Many times, he marched into an area of Gaul that was in unrest, and his legionaries constructed a fortified camp. This was a standard drill, and could be done very quickly. Since the Gauls had no siegecraft, they could not overcome the Roman defenses, and therefore Caesar would be able to sit there with his legions. Since the Gauls did not have Roman logistics, the large Gallic armies that invested Caesar had to disperse long before the Romans would run out of supplies, and Caesar would sortie from his camp and defeat the Gauls.
All contents of these pages Copyright 1997 by David H. Thornley.