Economics
I just returned a book to the library called The Birth of Plenty. It was a very interesting read, and I really wish I had time to finish it off; too much slacking right after I borrowed it and a list of requests after me. But the premise of it is a thought provoking one, especially in the face of the anti-globalization forces.
The theory goes that the explosive growth in technology, quality of living, income, and what not can be traced to a union of four factors. These four factors emerged first in Europe, and have yet to emerge everywhere:
Of the four, the last could be said to be in place pretty much everywhere in the globe. The Internet has done wonders for information exchange, even in restrictive nations. The other three are more dubious.
There is a postulate in the book that colonialism had a factor into determining the colonies ultimate prosperity. The US inherited England's property system, capital markets, rationalism, and had the chance to excise out the cruft-of-ages. Therefore, the US prospered. Mexico (and most of Latin America) inherited Spain's rather broken property institutions, which in turn crippled her ability to leverage capital. Therefore, Mexico lags behind.
There is an interesting passage that hilights the differences between property rights in different ex-colonial nations. This is from memory:
But not always. America was a new nation of European immigrants with strong institutions. Bolivia (to use an example) had relatively few European immigrants, and a lot of native-descendants. And not only that. The US rebellion was led by educated men with a strong basis in Western thinking, where the South American rebellions were more wars of self aggrandizement than throwing off the yolk of imperial rule.
The author also touched briefly on the problem the Arab world faces now. The Islamic states of North Africa in the 1500's started to become increasingly conservative, and less friendly to the spirit of inquiry that had the Iberian Moslems so dramatically beyond Christian Europe in the dark ages. These days, some Islamic states lack all keys to prosperity but efficient transportation. Others just lack one item, such as a spirit of scientific rationalism, or effective capital markets.
Another point that was made was that it isn't democracy that produces prosperity. Prosperity leads, generally, to democracy. Attempts to go from democracy to prosperity have been made in the past 60 years since colonialism's demise, and have failed in almost every case. You can have prosperity under authoritarian regimes, it just takes flexibility on the part of the leader. In fact, the Spanish legacy was rooted out more singularly in nations with 'benevolent autocrats' (Chile) than in nations that have been democratic for much longer, and as a result these ex-autocratic states have more robust economies than their neighbors.
The author paints a picture of France in the 1680-revolution period as one that looks remarkably like the Soviet state. Centrally planned, managed, and coordinated. The French state ultimately fell like the Soviets did, for much of the same reasons. At the end of the period, France had as many canals as England did, but her addiction to monopolies was such that all innovation was stamped out of her populace; a violation of the fourth principle.
The 'now' parts of the book were the ones that I didn't get to, so I can't speak as to his views on how to fix prosperity in the world today. One thing is clear, though. Protectionism in any form, be it punitive tariffs or subsidization, is in general bad for prosperity. And if the foes of 'globalization' are anything, they're protectionist (or at least a good percentage of 'em).
What I want to know is how foreign aid figures into the picture.
The theory goes that the explosive growth in technology, quality of living, income, and what not can be traced to a union of four factors. These four factors emerged first in Europe, and have yet to emerge everywhere:
- Efficient Property Rights.
- Scientific Rationalism
- Access to Capital Markets
- Access to Fast Transportation and Information Exchange For Goods and Services
Of the four, the last could be said to be in place pretty much everywhere in the globe. The Internet has done wonders for information exchange, even in restrictive nations. The other three are more dubious.
There is a postulate in the book that colonialism had a factor into determining the colonies ultimate prosperity. The US inherited England's property system, capital markets, rationalism, and had the chance to excise out the cruft-of-ages. Therefore, the US prospered. Mexico (and most of Latin America) inherited Spain's rather broken property institutions, which in turn crippled her ability to leverage capital. Therefore, Mexico lags behind.
There is an interesting passage that hilights the differences between property rights in different ex-colonial nations. This is from memory:
The most time consuming part of buying a house in America is agreeing to a price. Once that is done, you head to the County recorder, check to see if the title is clear, and if it is, transfer the property. Done!Due to a greedy king in the 1200's, England had codified property rights from way back. Few other places had such a thing. This particular institution was exported to England colonies, which is why a large number of them (America, Canada, Australia) are 'first world' nations now. Spain was not so lucky, in that her property institutions were very inefficient, which was also exported to her colonies to their detriment.
In Lima, Peru the same transaction takes 728 steps. Therefore, only the wealthy can afford to obtain clear title to properties. This encourages land to pass down in the family, subdividing as the generations go on. Because people can't guarantee that they have a clear title to the land they own, banks will not lend against that property because they can't be certain that some other party has an interest in the property already. This has a crippling effect on capital liquidity.
But not always. America was a new nation of European immigrants with strong institutions. Bolivia (to use an example) had relatively few European immigrants, and a lot of native-descendants. And not only that. The US rebellion was led by educated men with a strong basis in Western thinking, where the South American rebellions were more wars of self aggrandizement than throwing off the yolk of imperial rule.
The author also touched briefly on the problem the Arab world faces now. The Islamic states of North Africa in the 1500's started to become increasingly conservative, and less friendly to the spirit of inquiry that had the Iberian Moslems so dramatically beyond Christian Europe in the dark ages. These days, some Islamic states lack all keys to prosperity but efficient transportation. Others just lack one item, such as a spirit of scientific rationalism, or effective capital markets.
Another point that was made was that it isn't democracy that produces prosperity. Prosperity leads, generally, to democracy. Attempts to go from democracy to prosperity have been made in the past 60 years since colonialism's demise, and have failed in almost every case. You can have prosperity under authoritarian regimes, it just takes flexibility on the part of the leader. In fact, the Spanish legacy was rooted out more singularly in nations with 'benevolent autocrats' (Chile) than in nations that have been democratic for much longer, and as a result these ex-autocratic states have more robust economies than their neighbors.
The author paints a picture of France in the 1680-revolution period as one that looks remarkably like the Soviet state. Centrally planned, managed, and coordinated. The French state ultimately fell like the Soviets did, for much of the same reasons. At the end of the period, France had as many canals as England did, but her addiction to monopolies was such that all innovation was stamped out of her populace; a violation of the fourth principle.
The 'now' parts of the book were the ones that I didn't get to, so I can't speak as to his views on how to fix prosperity in the world today. One thing is clear, though. Protectionism in any form, be it punitive tariffs or subsidization, is in general bad for prosperity. And if the foes of 'globalization' are anything, they're protectionist (or at least a good percentage of 'em).
What I want to know is how foreign aid figures into the picture.
